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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

RUTH S. OLSEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
MORRIS F. SWAPP, et aL,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
13741

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant commenced an action in the Davis County
District Court to enjoin Bountiful City from rcmstructing
a sidewalk along the south side of her property without
paying compensation therefore.
DISPOSITION BELOW
There was a trial held in the Davis County District
Court on October 30, 1971. The Court found issues in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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favor of the respondent and signed a Judgment and Decree providing that Bountiful City was the owner of the
property and entitled to construct a sidewalk thetreon
and forever barred the plaintiff from asserting any title
or interest thereto. On June 5, 1974, the Court signed
an Order denying plaintiff's Motion to Amend Findings,
Make New Findings or in the Alternative for a New Trial.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the foregoing Judgment
and Decree.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
While appellant's statement of facts is correct in significant portions, respondent will state the facts as found
by the Court and supported by the record.
Appellant's home in which she lives is located on the
Northwest corner of Third North and Main Street in
Bountiful, Utah. Her house faces East. Appellant and
respondents dispute the ownership of a five foot strip
of property traversing east and west along the south
side of appellant's property. The respondents are desirous of constructing a sidewalk along this strip of ground
pursuant to a regularly created improvement district
and claims the property is included within the boundaries
of Third North Street. The appellant claims that the
five foot strip of property belongs to her and thus this
law suit.
Third North Street is a 3 rod street and is shown
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as such in the Bountiful Townsite, Plat "A", Which is
maintained in the office of the County Recorder of Davis
County, Utah, as an official record of said recorder and
kept and maintained in the same manner as other original townsite plats (R-42, 51, 52, 75). It is not known
when the plat was filed, and also whether recording information was assigned to the plat since none is noted
on the plat. This plat includes appellant's property which
is designated as Lot 1, Block 53, Plat A, Bountiful Townsite Survey in the Deed to her,, dated November 25, 1940
(Ex. Q). The plat sets out numerous blocks and streets
including Third North Street.
The first title owner of the property, now owned by
the appellants, was William Walton, who received title
from the Probate Judge in 1872 (Ex. J ) . In describing
the property reference was made to "Block 53, Plat A,
in the town of Bountiful". All subsequent conveyances,
including the conveyance made to appellants, describe
the property by reference to Block 53, Plat A (Ex. K, L,
M, N, 0, P, Q, R). It therefore seems evident that the
plat was of public record very early as it was repeatedly
referred to in instruments of conveyance from the very
beginning.
Appellant's father, James Smedley, acquired the
property in 1889 (Ex. P ) . It was apparently some time
subsequent to his acquiring ownership that a barbed wire
fence, and subsequently a hedge, was located along the
south bondary of the property and encroaching upon the
disputed 5 foot strip (R-6).
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Pertinent and material facts with respect to appellant
and her predecessors in interest and their relationship to
the property in question, are these:
a. They have never possessed any portion of
Third North Street prior to or at the time
of the entry of the Bountiful Townsite.
b. They have never had nor do they now have
any record title to any portion of Third
North Street and particularly of the property in question (Ex. J, K, L, M, N, 0, P,
Q,R).
c. They have never erected or maintained any
improvements within the boundaries of Third
North Street except for the maintenance of
the hedge along the south boundary of appellant's property which encroaches on the
north part of the street (R-6).
d. They have never paid any property taxes
covering any portion of Third North Street
and the property in question, and no taxes
have ever been assessed covering any portion
of said street (R-29).
e. Bountiful City lias never taken any action
of any kind to abandon or vacate any portion
of Third North Street and has never taken
any affirmative action of any kind which
would lead appellant to believe that the city
was abandoning., vacating or giving up any
interest in Third North Street or any part
thereof.
f. Third North is an improved street — there
never were any encroachments along the way
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and at least was open for passage way as
early as 1915 (R-31).
In 1927, a re-survey of the old Plat A, was made.
The survey is referred to as the Burningham Survey and
establishes monumentations (R-36). Insofar as it relates
to Block 53, there is apparently no dispute as to the
actual location of the boundaries of Third North Street
as it relates to the South boundary of appellant's property. Testimony of appellant's own surveyor and the
plat prepared by him, completely supported the facts
asserted by the respondents, that the N / S measurements
of Block 53, Plat A, as shown by the old Plat A, which
hangs in the Recorder's Office, the Burningham re-survey
and appellant's own survey, is exactly 330 feet (Ex. 5,
R-41). The South boundary of appellant's property is
described in the chain of title and is indicated by the
Burningham re-survey and the old Plat A; is therefore
north of the land in question; clearly excluding that land
from the property conveyed to appellant's predecessors
in title.
The City of Bountiful properly and regularly created
Bountiful Improvement District No. 9, for the purpose
of (instructing curbs, gutters and sidewalks along certain streets in Bountiful. One of the improvements to
be constructed is a sidewalk which as mentioned earlier
traverses along the property in question and adjoins appellant's property on the south. The sidewalk to be constructed is entirely within the boundaries of Third North
Street and entirely south of plaintiff's property.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN PROHIBITING THE APPELLANT IN TESTIFYING
AS TO MATTERS OF FAMILY HISTORY
RELATED TO HER BY HER FATHER PERTAINING TO BOUNDARIES, CONDITION
AND USE OF THE PREMISES.
The appellant alleges, that the Court erred in not
allowing testimony by her of statements made by her
father (now deceased), relating to bonudaries and improvements on the property (R-5-8).
Appellant argues that this testimony should have
been allowed as an exception of the hearsay rule. It is
true that declarations of persoos since deceased, with
regards to location of boimdary lines, etc., are usually
considered competent evidence even though hearsay. To
be admissible, however, the declaration must be made by
one who is disinterested at the time of such dedaration.
It must also be shown that the declarant had peculiar
knowledge of the facts, which facts form a part of the
res gestae. In the present case, there was no proper foundation made.
Even assuming that the statements and evidence
were otherwise admissible, such error was harmless. Section 776, 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error, provides as
follows:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"To warrant reversal, two elements must be
shown: error, and injury to the party appealing.
Error is harmless when it is trivial, formal, or
merely academic, and not prejudicial to the substantial rights of the party assigning it, and
where it, in no way, effects the final outcome of
the case; it is prejudicial, and ground for reversal, only when it affects the final result of
the case and works adversely to a substantial
right of the party assigning it."
Even if there was error, such error was cured by the
admission of other competent evidence. Exhibit P, which
shows a conveyance of portions of Block 53, Plat A, to
appellant's father, James Smedley in 1889, was admitted
into evidence (R-4). Appellant's surveyor testified as to
the location of Block 53, and his survey was admitted
into evidence (R-33, Ex. S). The appellant was able to
testify to her own knowledge concerning the location
of the hedge and various photos were introduced as to
its location (Ex. A, B, C). Other testimony concerning
improvements on Block 53, were immaterial unless they
related to the particular disputed strip of property. After
all the evidence was m, appellant was able to establish
the location of her south boundary, the location of the
disputed strip of property and the extent of improvements thereon. Appellant has failed to show any prejudicial error.
POINT II.

BASED ON THE FACTS IN THE RECORD
AND THE LAW APPLICABLE THERETO,
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THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND IN ADJUDICATING THAT BOUNTIFUL CITY WAS
THE RIGHTFUL OWNER OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY.
Appellant contends that she is entitled to the ownership of the 5 foot strip of property in question. She does
not contend that she, through her predecessors in interest, acquired title through some instrument of conveyance; nor does she contend that she could have acquired
the strip of land by adverse possession from the city. Such
a contention would be of little avail to the appellant in
view of Section 78-12-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1963.
Appellant asserts that the City of Bountiful is estopped
from claiming any interest in the portion of the street
in question because of the non-action of the city in asserting title to this portion of the street which led her to
believe the city claimed no interest in the strip of land
in question. It is the contention of the respondents that
the city can not be estopped under the laws of the State
of Utah.
It is doubtful that under the present statutes that
a Utah city can ever be estopped in claiming an interest
in a dedicated street. The earliest case to be decided
under our present statute involving the question of estoppel appears to be the case of Tooele City v. Elkington,
166 P. 2d 406, 100 Utah 45 (1941). In that case, an alley
way abutting the Elkington property was dedicated as
an alley in the original Townsite Plat of Tooele City.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The alley was never used as such, however, and was
always kept fenced within the Elkington property by
Elkington and his predecessor in interest. In 1938, the
City Council of Tooele passed a resolution to deed the
property to Elkington and pursuant to that resolution,
the Mayor of Tooele executed a Quit Claim Deed conveying the property to Elkington. Later, the city of
Tooele brought suit against Elkington to acquire title
in the alley in the city. The Utah Supreme Court held
that under Utah law, the only way the city could vacate
a dedicated street or alley, was by ordinance and that
therefore, the deed to Elkington from the city was illegal,
unauthorized and void. The Supreme Court also held
that the city was not estopped to claim title to the alley
because of its acts in deeding the alley to Elkington. It
noted that the city had been paid little by Elkington
for the alley and that there had never been a replatting
of the alley, and that the portion of the alley which
Elkington claimed had never been assessed for taxes to
the defendant. The Court stated:
^Balancing the justices of the cause, we find
there is no ground for estoppel against the city.
In so doing, we are mindful of the fact that individuals dealing with officers should be able to
rely upon their acts; that officers should act
within the authority granted; and that officers
should be held to their acts and covenants like
individuals. However, the community is interested in the vacating of streets and the legislature has provided that they be vacated by ordinance, in order that the community may have
notice of the acts of the commissions and thereby
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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protect the private property holder and the community against such actions."
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had the opportunity to review the Utah Law on this point in the case
of Provo City v. Denver and Rio Grande Railway Compony, 156 F. 2d 710 (1946). In that case, the railroad
needed to substantially expand its existing facilities. One
method contemplated was to construct new facilities outside of the City of Provo. The other alternative was to
enlarge existing facilities in the city but in order to do
so, it was necessary to obtain the vacation of an existing
street. The Railroad and the Mayor and Commissioners of the city entered into negotiations which resolved
in an oral agreement that an ordinance would be passed
closing the street. The railroad relying on this oral agreement barricaded the street and construced its enlarged
facilities. The agreed upon ordinance was never introduced or passed by the city. Citizens of Provo later protested the vacation of the street and the city in response
to such protest, removed the barricade and began work
to open the street as a public thoroughfare. The railroad then instituted proceedings to enjoin the city, its
Mayor and Commissioners from reopening the street contending that the city was estopped from contending that
the land in question was a dedicated street. This contention was rejected by the Tenth Circuit and the Railroad's case was directed to be dismissed. The Court held
that under the Utah Statutes* the city of Provo had the
power to vacate and close the street only by ordinance;
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that in absence of such ordinance, the adoption of equitable estopped could not be invoked against the city. The
count reviewed all prior Utah cases dealing with the adoption of the estoppel against the city involving city streets.
It stated that the Utah Statutes provided that the streets
or parts thereof should be vacated by ordinance. The
Court stated,
"These three cases considered in their composite
effect, seem to make it clear that in Utah, the
principal of estoppel in pais, is to be applied
very narrowly to a city in respect of its right to
re-open a street for use as a public thoroughfare
and only in cases where the city acted within
the ambit of its legal authority but in an irregular way; and that the principal does not have
controlling application in a case of this kind
where the Mayor and City Commissioners merely agree verbally to pass an ordinance closing
the street but never did again attempt to pass
it regular or irregular."
The most recent case on this question is to be that
of Cox v. Carlisle, Mayor of Manti City, 359 P. 2d 1049,
11 Utah 2nd 372 (1961). This involved an appeal from
a judgment which declared Manti City to be the owner
of a 66 foot strip of land platted as a city street. The
land in question had been platted as a city street by the
original townsite plat of the city of Manti. In 1871, the
plaintiffs predecessor in interest, obtained a Mayor's Deed
to a lot in Manti which adjoined both sides of the platted
street. The street, as platted, was not shown to have
even been used as a street. Irrigation improvements were
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made on the strip of land in question by the pliaintliff
commencing prior to 1910. Based upon these facts, the
Court held that there could be no estoppel against the
city in claiming title to the street in question. The court
stated:
"The proof here commands but one point that
we need canvass on appeal: is Manti City estopped to assert title in the strip platted as a
street. We believe and hold that this question
must be answered in the negative under the facts
adduced....
Significant are these: 1) Neither plaintiff nor
others ever paid any taxes on the property since
or before 1871; 2) No one has challenged the
ownership lieniated by the recorded plats 'til
here; 3) Manti has claimed no taxes thereon;
4) The evidence conflicts somewhat as to
whether the area was used as a roadway at the
time or for sometime after the deeds, the Townsite Entry and the establishment of proof by
claimants in the Probate Court, but there is ample, competent evidence that easily could lead
the arbiter of facts recently to conclude that the
strip so had been used; 5) that plaintiff, whose
burden it was to show occupancy for her or her
predecessors before and at the time of the townsite entry, showed none; 6) that the only affirmative documentary representation as to occupancy at that time, was a County Surveyor's
map, which has persisted by recordation to date,
reflecting the existence of the city street, and
importing notice to all, including plaintiff; and
7) that everyone concedes that the record fee
title thereto, has unbroken continuity to date in
Manti City.
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"No evidence except perhaps a legitimate silence
points to any Manti representation intended to
induce a reasonable person to claim title to the
strip upon which he acted to his detriment. Recordation of the plat and its persistence sans
challenge, inertia on the part of the plaintiff or
anyone else to pay or offer to pay taxes on the
area, and the use of the land by the plaintiff
and predecessors for a long period of time would
seem to have been more of a benefit, would not
support the luxury of a claim or irreparable damage on termination of such use, but would support an inoculation of the city against any claim
of estoppel."
From the foregoing cases, it would appear extremely
doubtful that the city would ever be estopped from title
to a portion of a dedicated street except in the case where
the city has attempted to vacate the street by ordinance.
Actually, Cox v. Carlisle (the Manti case), seems
clear to be controlling here since,
1.

Neither plaintiff or others ever paid any
taxes on the property.

2.

No one has challenged the ownership 'till
here.

3.

Bountiful has claimed no taxes thereon.

4.

The evidence is uncertain as to when the
area was used as a roadway, but at least,
as early as 1915, it was used as a pathway
and the road is presently improved and under use.

5.

That the appellant, whose burden it was to
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show occupancy for her or her predecessors
before and at the time of the Townsite Entry, showed none except the eoocroachment
by a fence and hedge.
6.

That everyone concedes that the recorded
fee title thereto, has never been held by
the appellant or her predecessors.

Appellant relies heavily on Hall v. North Ogden
City, 166 P. 2d 221, rehearing granted and judgment set
aside, 175 P. 2d 703 (1946). In that case, the plaintiff
instituted action to enjoin the town of North Ogden from
opening up as a street, certain tracts of land indicated
as streets, by the Townsite Plat,, but which had never
been opened or used as streets and upon which valuable
improvements have been erected by the plaintiffs. The
thrust of the Hall case was, where the land was occupied
prior to the entry of the townsite by the County Probate
Judge, pursuant to the Federal Townsite Act of 1867,
the occupant had an equitable interest in such land which
became vested when the land was entered by the Probate
Judge in the Land office and which was not divested for
failure to file a claim as long as the occupant remained
in possession. The important distinction between the
facts in the Hall case and those in the case at bar is in
Hall case, the early settlers possessed the entire street
area prior to the entry of the plat and subsequent title
holders continued to use and possess the property in question up to the time of trial.
In the case at; bar, at the time of the entry of the
plat, the area of Third North was not possessed by any
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of the adjoining owners, With the exception of the area
i J dispute, none of Third North has ever been possesed or
uned h> ,u. adjoining landowner
regards to
;m*a included within Third Nort
-w claimed by
;:anft I In only improvement is the maintenance of
-*(i£r :!»ojig the south boundary of appellant's propvWncii encroaches on the north part of the street.
.,is hedge was apparently planted sometime subsequent
in appellant's father purchasing the property in 1889
and subsequent to the entry of the plait, Then to, by
Plant's own admission, Third North was -^ed a*- a
formal street as early as 1930,•and'the actual aorth curb
line of the street comes to within approximately five feet
of the south boundary of appellant's property.
While 'the holding of the Hall case was reversed on
re-hearing, that reversal was based on the fact that the
street involved had never been dedicated or used as a
public street. It is significant that the Utah Supreme
Court has not retreated from the position it took in, the
first hearing, of the Hall case, Ififi P. 2<\ J2I and that
is that the city's interest in J dedicated street cannot
**• \<Y*t bv adversed poN>assioi* ••» i>ioj>pr!
J "In appellant asserts that Unre was a failure to
'K-dit-au- the street because apparently, neither the old
P k t A, nor the Bummgham re-survey had been recorded, in accordance with the current recording procedure This assertion, if accepted, would mean that not
only tiu* streets m Bountiful but according to testimony
given at uml, those at KavsvHIh- and Pamiington as well,
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are subject to ownership claims by contiguous property
owners.
This would be dearly an intolerable situation. The
better view is, that Plat A, was made of record very
early since all instruments of conveyance relating to Block
53, made reference to "Block 53» Plat A". The better view
is that although the recordation of some of the old plaits
may not have complied with current recording procedures, there was in essence, substantial compliance which
should be recognized as suffident in the interest of avoiding confusion and further Mitigations.
CONCLUSION
It is respetfully submitted that under the facts and
the applicable law, the appellant has foiled to show any
right or title to the property in question on the basis of
any feasible theory and accordingly, the decision of the
lower Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
LAYNE B. FORBES
Attorney for
Defendant-Respondent
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